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IVISREPRESENTATION AND MATERIALITY IN IMMIGRATION
LAW-SCOURING THE MELTING POT
INTRODUCTION
At the end of World War H, the Allied forces became the guardians of
approximately eight million displaced persons in Germany, Austria, and
Italy.1 These persons included liberated prisoners of war, forced laborers,
extermination camp prisoners, and refugees who had fled the advancing
Russian armies.2 By 1948, approximately seven million persons had been
repatriated pursuant to the voluntary repatriation policies implicit in the
Yalta agreement. 3 Over one million remained unsettled, however, with many
refusing to return home because they feared persecution 4 or the consequences
of political and social upheaval in their native countries. 5 Almost one half of
these people lived in camps operated by the Preparatory Commission for the
International Refugee Organization (IRO),6 an interim agency established by
the United Nations to perform the functions set forth in the proposed IRO
constitution 7 until the requisite number of countries accepted the IRO.8
1. S. Rep. No. 950, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1948] U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 2028,
2035 [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 950].
2. Id.
3. Yalta Conference, Feb. 11, 1945, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 59 Stat. 1874, E.A.S. No. 505. Repatri-
ation and resettlement policies were further discussed at a meeting in Moscow by the Council of
Foreign Ministers consisting of representatives of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, France, and the United Kingdom. 2 Dep't of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States 1947, at 427-33, 526-28 (1972).
4. See S. Rep. No. 950, supra note 1, at 8, reprinted in [1948] U.S. Code Cong. Serv. at
2036.
5. Id., reprinted in [1948] U.S. Code Cong. Serv. at 2035.
6. The Preparatory Commission was established by the Agreement On Interim Measures To
Be Taken In Respect Of Refugees And Displaced Persons, effective Dec. 31, 1946, 61 Stat. 2525,
T.I.A.S. No. 1583. It consisted of one representative from each country that had signed the
International Refugee Organization (IRO) Constitution, opened for signature Dec. IS, 1946, 62
Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846 (entered into force Aug. 20, 1948). Agreement On Interim Measures
at para. 1, 61 Stat. at 2526. The Commission's field organizations were in charge of the
maintenance, resettlement, and repatriation of displaced persons. I.R.O. Const., opened for
signature Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, 3038, T.I.A.S. No. 1846 (entered into force Aug. 20,
1948).
7. Opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846 (entered into force
Aug. 20, 1948). The preamble to the IRO constitution stated that the signatories recognized the
urgent international problem of refugees and displaced persons. It further provided that
"genuine" refugees and displaced persons be assisted in returning to their countries of origin or in
finding new homes. Germany and Japan were to pay the costs of assistance necessitated by their
wartime actions. I.R.O. Const. preamble, 62 Stat. at 3038, T.I.A.S. No. 1846. Membership was
open to members of the United Nations and any other states approved by the IRO General
Council. I.R.O. Const. art. 4, para. 1, 62 Stat. at 3040, T.I.A.S. No. 1846.
8. It was provided that the constitution would be effective when 15 states had signed
it. I.R.O. Const. art. 18, para. 2, 62 Stat. 3037, 3047, T.I.A.S. No. 1846. This occurred on
August 20, 1948. 62 Stat. at 3037, No. 283, 18 U.N.T.S. 3, 4 n.1. The countries that
signed, in sequence, were the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the Republic of China, Iceland,
Australia, the United States, Guatemala, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, the Dominican
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The United States Congress adopted the IRO constitution in 1947, 9 and, in
further response to the displaced persons problem, enacted the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948 (the DPA) 10 to facilitate the immigration of 202,000
displaced persons into the United States." The DPA specified that eligible
displaced persons were those defined in the IRO constitution' 2 as persons who
had been forced to leave their countries of origin by the Nazi or fascist
regimes. 13 The definition included, for example, forced laborers or persons
deported for "racial, religious or political reasons."'1 4 Originally, the DPA and
the IRO constitution differed slightly in specifying ineligible persons. The
DPA excluded the entry of "any person who is or has been a member of, or
participated in, any movement which is or has been hostile to the United
States." The IRO constitution, on the other hand, was specifically inappli-
cable to war criminals, quislings, traitors, and those who could be shown "to
have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries."' 6
Subsequent amendment of the DPA substantially incorporated the IRO
terminology by providing that visas would not be issued to "any person who
advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race,
religion, or national origin."'17 The DPA clearly intended that each person
seeking to establish his eligibility'" as a displaced person be subjected to a
thorough investigation of his character, history, and eligibility, 19 and that no
visas be issued to persons whom the consular or immigration officer had
reason to believe were not eligible under the DPA. 20 It further provided that
Republic, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Denmark. Id. at 3133, No. 283, 18 U.N.T.S. at
118, 120.
9. Act of July 1, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-146, 61 Stat. 214.
10. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended by Act of June 16,
1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219.
11. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 3(a), 62 Stat. 1009, 1010. Immigration visas,
limited to 202,000, were 'to be issued to eligible displaced persons without regard to quota
limitations for the two years following passage of the Act. By amendment, a limit of 341,000 visas
was imposed for the three years beginning in 1948. Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 4,
64 Stat. 219, 221. The Act was still within the annual quota system provided for in the Act of
May 26, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 12, 43 Stat. 153, 160-61. It was stipulated that the excess
above the annual quota would be subtracted, up to 50%, from the annual quotas in succeeding
years. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 3(b), 62 Stat. 1009, 1010.
12. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2(b), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009.
13. I.R.O. Const., opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, Annex I, pt. 1, § B, 62 Stat. 3037,
3050, T.I.A.S. No. 1846 (entered into force Aug. 20, 1948).
14. Id.
15. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 13, 62 Stat. 1009, 1014.
16. I.R.O. Const., opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, Annex I, pt. 2, 62 Stat. 3037, 3051,
T.I.A.S. No. 1846 (entered into force Aug. 20, 1948).
17. Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 1i, 64 Stat. 219, 227.
18. The Act placed the burden of proving eligibility for admission on the alien who sought
admission as an eligible displaced person. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62
Stat. 1009, 1013, as amended by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 9, 64 Stat. 219, 225.
The same requirement is present in the Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walters) Act of
1952 § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) (alien has the burden of proving eligibility to receive a visa).
19. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013.
20. Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 9, 64 Stat. 219, 225. The Amendment
provided a further safeguard; upon arrival at a United States port of entry, every person was to
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any person who willfully misrepresented his eligibility as a displaced person
would not be admitted.2 1 Any person admitted would be subject to all
immigration laws, including those governing deportation.
2 2
It has been claimed that despite these provisions, many alleged Nazi war
criminals entered the United States by misrepresenting or concealing their
whereabouts and activities during the war.2 3 Some of these persons subse-
quently became citizens through similar misrepresentations. 2 4 Over twenty
years elapsed before the United States instituted proceedings2 s to deport2 6 or
denaturalize 27  several alleged war criminals for willful misrepresenta-
take an oath swearing that he was not, nor had he been, a member of any group excluded by §
13. See notes 13-17 supra and accompanying text. Any person found to have perjured himself
because he actually was such a member was subject to prosecution for perjury and to deporta-
tion. Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 11, 64 Stat. 219, 227.
21. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013.
22. Id.
23. 123 Cong. Rec. 3159 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman); Allen, Na:i War Criminals in
the United States, 34 Jewish Veteran 12 (1979). See generally H. Blum, Wanted! The Search for
Nazis in America (1977).
24. See note 23 supra.
25. Various theories have been advanced to account for the delay in the institution of proper
legal proceedings. Some reasons offered include ineptitude on the part of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), corruption, support of these alleged criminals by persons in high
level government positions, and anti-communist sentiment in the early 1950s. See N.Y. Times,
Feb. 6, 1980, § A, at 4, col. 4; note 23 supra.
26. In re Hazners, No. A10-305-336 (INS N.Y., filed Jan. 28, 1977); In re Maikovskis, No.
A8-194-566 (INS N.Y., fied Dec. 20, 1976); In re Kaminskis, No. A6-659-477 (INS N.Y., filed
Oct. 13, 1976); In re Detlavs, No. A7-925-159 (INS Md., filed Oct. 13, 1976, refiled Sept. 27,
1978).
Deportation is an administrative procedure conducted by a special inquiry officer, 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b) (1976), known as an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(1) (L979); see 1 C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 5.1, at 5-7 to -8 (1978). The proceeding is
commenced by the issuance and service of an order to show cause. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(a) (1979).
Arrest of the alien pending proceedings is rare, although provided for by statute. 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a) (1976); see 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra, § 5.4a, at 5-53. The alien is entitled to
notice, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1976), representation by counsel, 8 C.F.R. § 242.10 (1979), and the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Id. § 242.16(a). The alien may designate the country to
which he will go if a deportation order is entered. Id. § 242.17(c). If that country refuses him
entry, the inquiry officer may designate a country. Id. The deportation order may be withheld if
the alien can show that he would be subject to persecution because of race, religion, or political
belief. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976). Any person against whom an order has been entered may
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1979). Furthermore, a final
administrative order may be subjected to judicial review, provided that administrative remedies
have been exhausted. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1976); see 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra, § 8.4b.
27. United States v. Soobzokov, No. 79-3468 (D.N.J., filed Dec. 5, 1979); United States v.
Linnas, No. 79-C-2966 (E.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 21, 1979); United States v. Koziy, No. 79-6640-
CIV-JCP (S.D. Fla., filed Nov. 20, 1979); United States v. Osidach, No. 79-4212 (E.D. Pa., filed
Nov. 20, 1979); United States v. Demjanjuk, No. CV 77-923 (N.D. Ohio, filed Aug. 25, 1977);
United States v. Pasker, No. CV 77-0167-RF (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 17, 1977); United States v.
Kowalchuk, No. 77-119 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 13, 1977); United States v. Kowalchuk, No. 77-118
(E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 13, 1977); United States v. Trifa, No. 5-70924 (E.D. Mich., filed May 16,
1975) (defendant's motion for summary judgment denied, Oct. 30, 1979).
Denaturalization is a suit in equity instituted by a United States attorney. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)
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tion or concealment of material facts in procuring visas2" or in petitioning for
naturalization. 29 Because some misstatements may have been innocuous or
(1976); see 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.5a. The suit can be commenced
upon an affidavit showing good cause. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976). If the certificate of naturaliza-
tion is revoked, the court enters an order cancelling the original certificate, which, if necessary, is
transferred to the original court that granted it. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (1976). The denaturalized
citizen must surrender his certificate. Id.
28. See Immigration & Nationality (McCarran-Walters) Act of 1952 § 212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(19) (1976). Grounds for deportation are listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976). One class of
deportable aliens includes those who were "at the time of entry . . . within one or more of the
classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry." 8 U.SC. § 1251(a)(1)
(1976). Grounds for exclusion are provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976), and include aliens who seek
to procure, or have sought to procure, or have procured a visa or other documentation "by fraud,
or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1976). The Displaced
Persons Act contained a similar provision. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62
Stat. 1009, 1013; see note 21 supra and accompanying text.
Another possible ground for the deportation of alleged war criminals is the commission of
crimes involving moral turpitude, which renders an alien excludable at entry. 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(9) (1976). A recent amendment makes any alien deportable if he "ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion,
national origin, or political opinion" in conjunction with Nazi Germany, its allies, or the
governments of Nazi-occupied countries. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(19) (Supp. 1979). By amendment,
these grounds also warrant exclusion. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(33) (Supp. 1979). Use of the new
grounds as a basis for deportation, however, may require more difficult proof than use of
misrepresentation. Evidence that the truth would have led to an investigation that would have
revealed substantial questions of eligibility and that might have led to exclusion would satisfy
the misrepresentation test for materiality and support deportation. Use of the amendment,
however, would probably require proof that the alien actually and voluntarily participated In war
crimes.
The procedure for deportation by administrative action is set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976); see
note 26 supra. Until 1961, there was no direct statutory authority for judicial review. It is now
provided for in 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1976), as amended by Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650, 651-53. Appeal to a United States Court of Appeals for final
determination is permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
29. It is the duty of the United States district attorneys to institute denaturalization proceed-
ings on the ground that the certificate of naturalization and the order admitting the person to
citizenship "were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by
willful misrepresentation." 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976). Illegal procurement as a ground for
denaturalization originally appeared in the Act of June 29, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 15, 34
Stat. 596, 601, and in the Act of Oct. 14, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 338(a), 54 Stat. 1137,
1158-59. It was not, however, originally included in the 1952 Act. The provision was reinstated
in § 1451(a) as an alternative ground for denaturalization in 1961. Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L,
No. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 650, 656. It is difficult to distinguish between the grounds of
misrepresentation and illegal procurement, but the specification of separate charges implies that
they are not synonymous. Illegal procurement usually refers to having been granted citizenship
without complying with prescribed statutory requirements "without any affirmative indication of
deception." 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.4c, at 20-19. The common practice,
however, is to join the charges of illegal procurement and misrepresentation in the same
complaint. Id.
Denaturalization of Nazi war criminals who entered after the 1951 expiration date of the
Displaced Persons Act might be accomplished by using both theories and claiming that the
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petitioner was not a person of good moral character as required in 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976).
Lack of good moral character is defined in reference to enumerated categories in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)
(1976), but is not limited to those categories. In addition, the court is not limited in its
investigation of good moral character to the prescribed periods, but may in its discretion examine
good moral character at any time prior to that period. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) (1976);, see United States
v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (denaturalization of citizen found to have been
member of German Gestapo and to have committed atrocities), rev'd and remanded on
presentation of newly discovered evidence, Nos. 79-1587, 79-1140 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 1980); note 58
infra and accompanying text.
The Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walters) Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976),
does not prescribe a time limit for insituting a denaturalization suit- Costello v. United States, 365,
U.S. 265, 283 (1961) ("Congress has not enacted a time bar applicable to proceedings to revoke
citizenship procured by fraud."); 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfleld, supra note 26, § 20.2e, at 20-9.
Therefore, naturalization is subject to revocation at any time after citizenship is granted, and it is
not unusual to revoke a naturalization obtained years earlier. Id.; see Costello v. United States,
365 U.S. at 281 (delay of 27 years); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 350 (1960) (delay of 19
years); United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1979) (delay of 10 years), cert.
granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-5602). The Supreme Court has rejected
contentions that a denaturalization proceeding instituted years after the grant of the petition is
barred by laches. "[A]ny harm from the lapse of time was to the Government's case." Costello v.
United States, 365 U.S. at 283; see United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 1963); 3 C.
Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.2e, at 20-10. Similarly, res judicata is not a bar to
denaturalization suits. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 241 (1912); 3 C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.2f. In Johannessen, the Supreme Court reasoned that denaturali-
zation "does not purport to deprive a litigant of the fruits of a successful controversy in the courts
[because] the proceedings for naturalization are not in any proper sense adversary proceedings,
but are ex parte and conducted by the applicant for his own benefit." 225 U.S. at 241. The Court
further stated that a naturalization certificate, "like other public grants [is] to be revoked if and
when it shall be found to have been unlawfully or fraudulently procured." Id. at 238. Subsequent
decisions have rejected the res judicata defense because the statute authorizing denaturalization
was "designed to afford cumulative protection against fraudulent or illegal naturalization."
United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 327 (1917); see Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17, 23
(1923). An alternative rationale is that the fraud in obtaining citizenship had not been in issue in
the naturalization proceeding and, therefore, the fraud "was [neither] adjudicated nor could have
been adjudicated." Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 671 (1945); see 3 C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.2f.
Furthermore, the Act does not specify a period of limitation restricting the time in which
deportation proceedings must be instituted. 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 4.6b,
at 4-33 to -34. Moreover, mere delay in instituting deportation proceedings does not estop the
United States from such action. Hamadeh v. INS, 343 F.2d 530, 532-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 838 (1965); Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33, 39-40 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
964 (1955); see I C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 4.6b, at 4-34. Extended residence
in the United States does not give the unnaturalized alien a special status exempting him from
deportation. Id. In two cases, aliens who had been United States residents for over twenty years
claimed that the length of residence indicated allegiance to the United States and thus made them
"nationals" and not amenable to deportation. Oliver v. United States Dep't of Justice, 517 F.2d
426, 427-28 (2d Cir. 1975); Carreon-Hernandez v. Levi, 409 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (D. Minn.
1976). An alien is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1976), as "any person not a citizen or national
of the United States," while a national is defined as a "person who, though not a citizen of the
United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (1976).
Both cases, however, held that the person is considered a deportable alien until naturalized. 517
F.2d at 427-28; 409 F. Supp. at 1210. All grounds for deportation retroactively apply to activities
engaged in prior to the enactment of the 1952 Act. 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(d) (1976); see Gardos v. INS,
324 F.2d 179, 180 (2d Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court has held that not all retroactive
applications conflict with the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because that
prohibition applies only to criminal statutes. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593-95
(1951).
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irrelevant, and because of the severe sanctions30 involved in denaturalization
and deportation, a standard of materiality is required. 3 1 The determination of
the materiality of misrepresented or concealed facts is based on a two part test
formulated in 1960 by the Supreme Court in Chaunt v. United States.32
Materiality exists under Chaunt if it is shown either "that facts were sup-
pressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship" 33 or,
alternatively, that disclosure of these facts "might have been useful in an
investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial
of citizenship. '34 Although the meaning of the first test is clear, 35 an examina-
tion of denaturalization and deportation cases since Chaunt reveals confusion
and inconsistency regarding the interpretation and application of the second
test. Some courts have subsumed this second test into the first by requiring
proof that the truth would have warranted denial of a visa or of naturaliza-
tion. 36 Other courts have apparently ignored the existence of the second test
by holding that the first test is the only one to apply. 37
It is crucial to clarify the meaning of this second test because the resolution
of many pending cases may depend on whether facts misrepresented or
concealed were material. 38 The seriousness of the alleged crimes and the
gravity of denaturalization and deportation demand a test of materiality
that is consistent. This Comment contends that the second test does have a sep-
arate and meaningful existence apart from the first. Use of the second test is
necessary to determine the outcome of cases in which the alien's actions have
made it impossible to prove by the required "clear, unequivocal, and convinc-
ing evidence" 39 that the alien was ineligible to enter the United States or to be
naturalized as a United States citizen. Part I of this Comment briefly examines
immigration procedure. Part II discusses misrepresentation and the standard
of materiality in other areas of law. Part III surveys denaturalization and
deportation case law prior to Chaunt. Part IV analyzes the Chaunt decision
and its interpretation by the Attorney General. 40 Part V discusses the appli-
30. See note 65 infra.
31. See 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.4b, at 20-13 (1978); Appleman,
Misrepresentation in Immigration Law: Materiality, 22 Fed. B.J. 267, 276 (1962); Fieldsteel,
Visa Fraud And Materiality, 12 Immig. & Natur. Rep. 3, 3 (1963).
32. 364 U.S. 350 (1960). While Chaunt involved denaturalization, the tests have been cited
and used in deportation cases. See, e.g., Suite v. INS, 594 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1979); Castaneda-
Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1977); La Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297 (9th
Cir. 1974); Kassab v. INS, 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1966); Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642
(Ist Cir. 1961).
33. 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960).
34. Id.; see notes 175-87 infra and accompanying text.
35. See Appleman, supra note 31, at 267-68.
36. E.g., United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597 F.2d 946
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-5602).
37. E.g., United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962).
38. See notes 25-31 supra and accompanying text.
39. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (deportation); Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (denaturalization). This standard has been described as "heavier" than
the civil standard but "conceptually not quite as exacting as" the criminal. 3 C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.5d, at 20-34; see notes .33, 88 infra.
40. In re S- & B-C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1168 (1961). The Attorney General is charged with the
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cation and construction of the Chaunt test and highlights the misinterpreta-





The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952-42 prohibits an alien from
entering the United States unless he holds a valid, unexpired immigrant
visa properly issued by an American consular officer outside the United
States.4 3 In his visa application, the alien is required to give information
about his background in order to identify himself."4 The burden of proof is on
the applicant to establish his eligibility to the satisfaction of the officer. 4S No
visa can be issued if statements in the application or other documentation
indicate that the alien is ineligible or if the consular officer "knows or has
reason to believe" that the alien is ineligible under the Act.4 6 The application
is signed and sworn to before the consular officer once he is sufficiently
convinced of the alien's eligibility. 47 The alien is then registered, finger-
printed, 48 and subjected to a physical and mental examination. 49 Further
investigation of eligibility occurs upon the alien's arrival at a United States
port of entry.A0 The alien may be detained for further inquiry by a special
administration and enforcement of the .Immigration and Nationality Act. His determinations and
rulings on all questions of law are controlling. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976); see pt. ,V(B) infra.
41. A given fact is material in relation to the matter in question, rather than in and of itself.
In immigration law, these questions involve entry into the United States through the grant of a
visa, 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1976), and the naturalization of an immigrant through the grant of a
petition. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1445-1447 (1976). Some knowledge of immigration procedure is helpful in
analogizing materiality in other areas of the law to materiality in immigration law. Knowledge of
procedure also aids in determining whether a misrepresented fact might be material in relation to
that procedure.
42. Act of June 27, 1952 (McCarran-Walters), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976)).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1976). An immigrant visa is one "properly issued by a consular officer
. to an eligible immigrant under the provision of this chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(16) (1976). A
consular officer is defined as "any consular, diplomatic, or other officer of the United States
designated under regulations prescribed under authority contained in this chapter, for the purpose
of issuing immigrant or nonimmigrant visas." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(9) (1976).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1976). The information required by the statute includes, for example,
the alien's name or any other name that he has used or by which he has been known, his age,
date and place of birth, marital status, past and present residences, and occupation. Id. The alien
must inform the officer if he has ever been arrested, convicted, or imprisoned, whether he is a
member of any class of individuals excluded from admission, or if he claims to be exempt from
exclusion. Id. He must also provide any other information necessary to his identification as
prescribed by regulations. Id.
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976); see note 18 supra.
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1976). At present, there are 33 grounds for exclusion. 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a) (1976); 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182(a)(32)-(33) (Supp. 1979). One ground is the procurement of a
visa by misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1976).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(e) (1976).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1976).
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (1976).
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1976).
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inquiry officer if the immigration officer s ' at the port of entry believes there is
some doubt as to the alien's eligibility s2
Naturalization is the conferral of United States citizenship on a person
after birth.5 3 It involves a process of application and inquiry regarding
eligibility similar to that for immigration. The applicant files a petition in the
district court of the district in which he resides.5 4 He is subject to a
preliminary examination and to a personal investigation" by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS).5 6 The applicant has the burden of proving
lawful entry, fulfillment of residency requirements,5 7 and good moral charac-
ter for prescribed periods.58 Following the investigation, a final hearing is
held in open court. 9 A successful conclusion results in the petitioner taking
an oath of allegiance 60 and receiving a certificate of naturalization. 6 1
Immigration and naturalization determinations are not the result of simple
decisions to grant or deny entry and citizenship. Rather, they are the result of
complex investigatory processes designed to convince the officers that an alien
is truly eligible for those privileges.6 2 If an alien misrepresented or concealed
a material fact, an officer may have been led into making a decision he would
not have made if all material facts had been revealed. Moreover, regardless of
51. An immigration officer is "any employee or class of employees of the [INS] or of the
United States designated by the Attorney General, individually or by regulation, to perform the
functions of an immigration officer specified by this chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(18) (1976).
52. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226 (1976).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (1976).
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1976).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1446 (1976).
56. The INS was established pursuant to 8 U.S.C § 1551 (1976).
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1976). No person can be naturalized unless he has fulfilled residency
requirements after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976). The petitioner must have maintained a permanent residence in
the United States for at least five years after lawful admission, and during the five years
preceding filing of the petition, must have been physically within the United States for at least
two and one half years. He must also have resided continuously in the United States from the
date of the petition to the granting of the petition, and have been a person of good moral
character "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States" during those
periods. Id. No person will be found to be of good moral character if he falls within certain
enumerated categories. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1976). One ground is the giving of false testimony "for
the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (1976). In
determining whether the petitioner has been of good moral character, the court has the discretion
to examine his conduct at any time prior to the five year period preceding the filing of the
petition. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) (1976).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1447 (1976).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1976). The petitioner must swear to support and defend the United
States Constitution and laws, renounce allegiance to the state of which he was formerly a citizen,
and promise to bear arms on behalf of the United States unless excused by reasons of religious
belief. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1976).
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1449 (1976). The certificate certifies that the petitioner has complied with
naturalization law and that an order of admission as a United States citizen has been entered by
the court as specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (1976).
62. 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 14.3; see United States v. Ginsberg, 243
U.S. 472, 475 (1917).
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whether the truth would have warranted a different decision, the misrep-
resentation may also have effectively impeded the investigatory processes that
are at the heart of the Immigration and Nationality Act 63 by preventing other
relevant inquiries bearing on admissibility. A brief examination of fraud in
tort, contract, criminal, and securities law indicates that such an impediment
is a sufficient basis for finding a misrepresented fact to be material. 64
II. COMPARATIVE MATERIALITY
Admittedly, both tort and contract law usually involve transactions in which
the primary losses and penalties are monetary. Although deportation and
denaturalization involve higher stakes, 65 it is still helpful to apply tort and
contract principles to immigration law. 66 In the tort of fraudulent misrep-
resentation, 67 the fact is deemed material if a reasonable person would
consider the existence or nonexistence of the fact important in determining his
course of action. 68 Although the fact must have played a substantial role in
affecting the injured party's decision, it is not necessary that the representa-
tion have been the decisive factor in his choice. 69 Contract law generally
63. Act of June 27, 1952 (McCarran-Walters), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976)).
64. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
65. It has been said that "denaturalization, like deportation, may result in the loss 'of all that
makes life worth living.' " Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 659 (1946) (quoting Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)). Deportation is considered "a drastic measure and at times
the equivalent of banishment or exile." Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see
Barber v. Gonzalez, 347 U.S. 637, 642 (1954). Courts have recognized that while the immediate
effect of denaturalization is to divest the naturalized person of his status as a citizen and to restore
him to the status and consequences of alienage, "[tlhe immediate hardship of deportation is often
greater than that inflicted by denaturalization, which does not, immediately at least, result in
expulsion from our shores." Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966).
The denaturalized person is deportable for illegal entry or other impropriety in his alien status,
but not, for example, for entering legally and then perjuring himself as to a material fact in his
application for naturalization. 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.6, at 20-37.
Because the denaturalization decree is effective as of the original date of the certificate of
naturalization, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976), denaturalization erases any benefits that citizenship
status produced before revocation. Perhaps the most severe consequence of denaturalization is its
effect on derivative rights acquired by the naturalized person's dependents. The 1952 Act
provides a complicated formula to determine the extinguishment of derivative rights that is
dependent on the basis of the revocation. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(f) (1976); see C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.6, at 20-39 to -40.
66. See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417, 431 & n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (tort and
contract tests of materiality are similar to those in immigration law).
67. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 525-549 (1977). Fraudulent misrepresentation
requires proof of a false representation of a material fact, scienter, intent, justifiable reliance, and
damage. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). Reliance
establishes the causal connection between the misrepresentation and the damage. Id. at 714. It
must be shown that the fact misrepresented and relied on is material to prove that the reliance
was justified. Id. at 714-15, 718; accord, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538(1) (1977).
68. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538(2)(a) (1977); accord, W. Prosser, supra note 67,
§ 105, at 718; James & Gray, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 Md. L. Rev. 488, 497 (1978);
Comment, The Element of Materiality in Deceit Cases, 29 Tex. L. Rev. 644, 645 (1951).
69. W. Prosser, supra note 67, § 105 at 715.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
agrees that the misrepresented fact is considered material if it would be likely
to affect the reasonable person's conduct during the transaction.7 0
The use of expressions such as "course of action" and "conduct" indicates
that the fact may be considered material not only in relation to the ultimate
decision, but also as it affects the entire process of decisionmaking, which
encompasses the investigation necessary to arrive at the decision. If tort and
contract materiality standards were applied to immigration law, the issue
would be whether the official charged with determining eligibility7' would
have considered the misrepresented or concealed fact important in determin-
ing his course of action.
72
Similarly, securities law differs from immigration law because the misrep-
resentation affects a financial transaction rather than the acquisition of
privileges inherent in admission to the United States or the attainment of
citizenship. v3 Consideration of the materiality standard in securities law,
however, is appropriate because the penalties imposed for the misrepresenta-
tion are severe, 7 4 as are those imposed for misrepresentation in the immigra-
tion process.7 5 The test for materiality in securities law set forth by the
Supreme Court examines whether there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider the misrepresented facts or omissions
significant in his deliberations.7 6 The Court has specifically rejected a stan-
70. Restatement of Contracts § 470(2) (1932); accord, Restatement of Restitution § 8(2)
(1937); 1 G. Palmer, The Law of Restitution §§ 3.3, 3.19, at 267, 351-S2 (1978). But see
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 304(2) (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1976) ("A misrepresentation is
material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent . . . ."). The
view in contract law that materiality is to be judged by whether the fact is likely to affect conduct
has been deemed an objective test, in contrast to a subjective test that requires a showing that
the contract would not have been made had the truth been known. J. Calamari & J. Perillo,
Handbook of the Law of Contracts § 9-14, at 279 & n.99 (2d ed. 1977).
71. The general powers of immigration officers and employees are set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1357
(1976). Determinations of eligibility for visas are made if a consular officer is satisfied as to the
alien's eligibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976). Similarly, a petitioner must prove his eligibility for
citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1976).
72. Course of action and conduct, with respect to -isas and naturalization, include not only
the official's ultimate determination, but his investigation of the applicant's fitness. See pt. I supra.
Therefor6, the issue should encompass whether the official would have considered the fact
important in determining the nature of the investigation or whether further investigation would
have been required. For example, it is conceivable that had the truth been revealed, an official
would actually have suspended his final decision pending further investigation. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1951); United States
v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 169, 175 (D. Md. 1957).
73. E.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 290 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting) (admission);
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943) (citizenship); see note 120 ibtfra and
accompanying text.
74. A person convicted of a violation of any provision of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976), is subject to a fine of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for up
to five years. Id. § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976).
75. See note 65 supra.
76. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). A large part of securities
law enforcement has involved the fraudulent dissemination of information necessary for investing
and shareholder voting. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10(b), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§
78j(b), 78n(a) (1976); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 14a-9 (1979). The Securities and Exchange
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dard of whether a person might have considered the fact important, 7 as well
as a requirement that the true facts would have actually caused the share-
holder to change his vote or to refrain from investing.78 The facts are material
if the true facts would "have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." ' 9
The securities test for materiality can be applied to immigration law by
substituting for the investor, the immigration or consular officer who would
have perceived a significantly different mix in the information designed to
inform him of the alien's fitness and eligibility for entry or citizenship. The
test for materiality in immigration 0 indicates that the fact would be
sufficiently material if this different mix of information would have led to
further investigation regarding eligibility. 8 1 Proof that a different ultimate
determination would have resulted would not be required.
The harsh penalties imposed,82 and the high burden of proof required83 by
the federal crimes of perjury84 and criminal fraud 85 indicate that one can
profitably compare their tests in determining the proper test of materiality for
deportation and denaturalization, 86 in which the burden of proof8 7 falls
between the civils and criminal standards. 89 The tests of materiality in
perjury and criminal fraud examine the misrepresentation's "natural effect or
tendency to influence, impede, or dissuade the [tribunal or officer] from
pursuing [the] investigation," 90 or its capacity to influence a determination to
Commission has made it unlawful "It]o make any untrue statement of a material fact . . . in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security," 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), and to solicit
proxies with information that is "false or misleading with respect to any material fact." Id. §
240.14a-9. While TSC dealt with shareholders' voting rights under § 14(a), its applicability to
investing under § 10(b) is evident by the vacation and remand of an investment case in light of
TSC. See Cohn & Co. v. Woolf, 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
77. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 449 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
80. See Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960). The test is set forth at notes 33-34
supra, 175 infra and accompanying text.
81. See notes 175-87 infra and accompanying text.
82. The penalties for perjury include a fine of $2,000 and/or up to five years imprisonment. 18
U.S.C. § 1621 (1976). A conviction for criminal fraud can result in a $10,000 fine andlor
imprisonment for up to five years. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
83. The standard of persuasion in criminal cases is "beyond a reasonable doubt." 9 J.
Wigsmore, Evidence § 2497, at 317 (3d ed. 1940).
84. Perjury is the willful misrepresentation of a material fact during testimony under oath
before a tribunal or an officer. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976).
85. The criminal fraud statute prohibits the falsification of a material fact before any federal
officer in a matter within the jurisdiction of a United States department or agency. 18 U.S.C. §
1001 (1976).
86. Commentators have noted the relevance of these statutes to immigration law. See C.
Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, §§ 9.35-.36; Appleman, supra note 31, at 276. Appleman
has actually suggested that the tests be used to determine materiality for deportation. Id.
87. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
88. The standard of persuasion in civil cases is by a "preponderance of evidence." 9 J.
Wigmore, supra note 83, § 2498, at 318.
89. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
90. United States v. Gremillion, 464 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085
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be made, or a governmental function to be performed. 9 1 The comparison is
enhanced by the connection that perjury and criminal fraud have with
immigration law. For example, one who swears to false statements before an
immigration or consular officer who is authorized by federal law to administer
oaths92 may be guilty of perjury.9 3 The Second Circuit's test of materiality in
this situation is whether a truthful answer might have induced the institution
of an investigation. 4 The court's focus on the false answer's potential to affect
an investigation is in accord with other perjury cases. 95 Furthermore, this test
is broader than the Supreme Court's test for immigration law 96 that an
investigation was actually impeded. 97 The Second Circuit, however, also
requires, for a finding of perjury, that the potential investigation might have
resulted in the refusal of a visa. 98 This factor narrows the perjury test and
brings it closer to the Supreme Court's requirement in immigration cases that
the potential for other facts warranting denial be present. 99
The inclusion of all United States officers, including immigration officials,
in the criminal fraud statute100 magnifies the relationship of criminal fraud to
(1972); accord, United States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Lardieri, 497 F.2d 317, 319 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Masters, 484 F.2d 1251, 1254 (10th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1970).
91. United States v. Guthartz, 573 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978);
United States v. Johnson, 530 F.2d 52, 54 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976);
Tzantarmas v. United States, 402 F.2d 163, 168 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 966 (1969);
Poulos v. United States, 387 F.2d 4, 6 (10th Cir. 1968); Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d 245, 246
(8th Cir. 1963); Moses, The Misrepresentation Problem: An Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 21 S.C.
L. Rev. 335, 340 (1969).
This test is broader than the test used in tort and contract law. Rather than examining whether
the fact would have influenced a course of action, the test limits its focus to whether the fact
might have influenced an investigation or governmental function. United States v. Guthartz, 573
F.2d at 228 (fraud); United States v. Howard, 560 F.2d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1977) (perjury); United
States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1976) (perjury); United States v. Johnson, 530 F.2d
at 54 n.3 (fraud); United States v. Masters, 484 F.2d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 1973) (perjury); United
States v. Wesson, 478 F.2d 1180, 1181 (7th Cir. 1973) (perjury); United States v. Gremlillon, 464
F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972) (perjury); Poulos v. United States,
387 F.2d at 6 (fraud); Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d at 246 (fraud).
92. Embassy and consular officers are authorized to administer oaths pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §
1203 (1976). Designated officers are empowered to administer oaths by 8 U.SC. § 1357(b) (1976).
93. Punishment for this type of perjury is imprisonment for up to three years and a fine of up
to $3,000. 22 U.S.C. § 1203 (1976). The penalties for false swearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(b)
(1976), are provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976).
94. United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 408 (2d Cir. 1956) (perjury found from
false statement by alien in application for immigrant visa that he had never been arrested or
convicted).
95. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
96. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
97. Id.; see notes 178, 187 infra and accompanying text.
98. United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 408 (2d Cir. 1956).
99. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960). The second test of materiality in
Chaunt is whether the truth "might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the
discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship." Id.; see notes 175-87 itra and
accompanying text.
100. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955); see 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield,
supra note 26, § 9.36, at 9-79.
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immigration. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has held a false statement made
before an immigration officer to be material, for purposes of criminal fraud, if
it could affect or influence the exercise of the function of the INS.10 ' Although
this "could" test is broader than the "would" tests of tort and immigration
law, one commentator has suggested that the tests of materiality used in
perjury and criminal fraud should also be used for deportation and de-
naturalization. 1
0 2
Significantly, the determination of materiality in the aforementioned areas
requires neither a showing that the injured party's decision would have been
altered, nor a showing that the outcome of the affected investigation would
have differed had the truth been known. The important factor in determining
materiality in these areas is whether the fact was so significant to the course of
action that there is a substantial likelihood that it would have actually
affected that course of action. 103 In immigration law, a fact would clearly be
material if the truth would have led to a different decision. The significance of
the misrepresented fact should also be viewed in relation to the course of
action that is the INS's function--conducting a series of investigations,
applications, oaths, and inquiries, 10 4 all of which are utilized in arriving at
the ultimate decision.
Ill. PRE-Chaunt CASE LAW
A. Denaturalization
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t~o establish an uniform Rule
of Naturalization. " 10 5 Under Article 1, Congress may grant the privilege of
citizenship in its discretion, limited only by the requirement of uniformity.
0 6
Congress exercised this power in response to widespread abuses in the
naturalization process affecting the masses of immigrants who came into the
United States in the nineteenth century.' 0 7 It enacted legislation in 1906 to
standardize naturalization procedure, 0 8 including a provision making it the
duty of the United States district attorneys to institute denaturalization
proceedings "on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such certificate of
101. Tzantarmas v. United States, 402 F.2d 163, 168 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
966 (1969) (false answer given regarding marital status in INS proceeding).
102. Appleman, supra note 31, at 276. A test that focuses only on the potential to impede
investigation is too broad to be applied to deportation and denaturalization. Although the
penalties imposed by the crimes deprive one of personal liberty, expulsion from the United States
or deprivation of United States citizenship and its corresponding privileges require a more
stringent standard. Such a standard should require a showing that an investigation was actually
impeded. See notes 178, 193, 289 infra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 67-102 supra and accompanying text.
104. See pt. I supra.
105. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, d. 4.
106. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 672 11944).
107. United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 473 (1917); accord, 3 C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.2b, at 20-5.
108. Act of June 29, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596. The Act was designed -[tlo
establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a uniform rule for the
naturalization of aliens throughout the United States." Preamble, 34 Stat. at 596.
19801
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citizenship was illegally procured.' 10 9 The Nationality Act of 19401 10 retained
this provision, prescribing the same grounds of fraud and illegal procurement
to warrant the revocation of citizenship.111 Although the wording was
changed in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952112 to "concealment of
a material fact or by willful misrepresentation,"' 13 this language has not
altered the focus of the 1906 and 1940 provisions."t 4 Rather, this wording was
adopted to clarify confusion concerning the meaning of and connotations as-
sociated with the word "fraud.""15
The first denaturalization case,"16 though it did not delve into the materi-
ality issue, may have contributed to the current uncertainty surrounding the
109. Act of June 29, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 15, 34 Stat. 596, 601. The Supreme Court
held this provision constitutional in 1912 and again in 1917. United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S.
472 (1917); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912). In Johannessen, the Court held
that the statute "makes nothing fraudulent or unlawful that was honest and lawful when it was
done," but merely deprived the naturalized citizen "of a privilege that was never rightfully his."
Id. at 242-43. The Court also rejected the contention that the statute was an ex post facto law,
saying that the statute was not punitive but only served to deprive the wrongdoer of "ill-gotten
privileges." Id. at 242. In Ginsberg, the Court held that "[nlo alien has the slightest right to
naturalization unless all statutory requirements are complied with; and every certificate of
citizenship must be treated as granted upon condition that the Government may challenge It as
provided in § 15 and demand its cancellation unless issued in accordance with such require-
ments." 243 U.S. at 475. The case was specifically concerned with illegal procurement rather than
with fraud, and thus concentrated on the absence of compliance with statutory requirements as a
ground for revocation. Id.; see note 29 supra. See also Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 24
(1913) (statute held constitutional; it does not discriminate against naturalized citizens because It
results in the annulment of rights of citizenship to which they were never entitled). The Supreme
Court later upheld the statute as incidental to the constitutional power to establish a uniform rule
of naturalization, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and the necessary and proper clause, U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Knauer v. United States, 328 U S. 654, 673 (1946).
110. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137. The Act was intended "Itlo
revise and codify the nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality code."
Preamble, 54 Stat. at 1137.
111. Id. § 338(a), 54 Stat. at 1158-59.
112. Act of June 27, 1952 (McCarran-Walters), Pub L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1976)).
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976). The provision did not require revocation on the ground of
illegal procurement; that ground was restored by the Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, §
18, 75 Stat. 650, 656. See 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.4c, at 20-17 to -18.
114. See notes 109-11 supra and accompanying text.
115. "ETihe 1952 Act made no substantial change in the amenability to denaturalization for
fraud, and ... its changed language was intended primarily to make certain that both extrinsic
and intrinsic fraud were included." 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 20.4b, at 20-13
(footnote omitted); accord, Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 271 (1961). "Extrinsic" fraud
has been described as "a fraud collateral to the issue being tried, such as the concealment of
witnesses." S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 756 (1950), while "intrinsic" fraud is "fraud
such as perjury of the parties or witnesses, or false swearing as to length of residence." Id.
(footnote omitted). Because of conflicts as to which type of fraud warranted revocation, the
Senate subcommittee recommended that the original provision relating to fraud be changed to
read "concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation," as willful misrepresentation
is "more easily proved than is an allegation of fraud." Id. at 769 (emphasis added).
116. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
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definition of materiality. The Supreme Court held that "[an] alien has no
moral nor constitutional right to retain the privileges of citizenship if, by false
evidence or the like, an imposition has been practiced upon the court, without
which the certificate of citizenship could not and would not have been
issued. 1117 The Court, however, did not indicate that this was the only
circumstance in which revocation was possible. Because the acts showed that
the truth would have foreclosed the defendant's naturalization,'" 8 the Court
did not have to reach any other test.
Later decisions tended to emphasize the importance of the investigation
involved in granting citizenship.1 1 9 Stressing the great privilege granted by
naturalization,1 20 courts required that the petitioner meet the "highest stan-
dard of rectitude. 1 21 Thus, the petitioner has the duty to give, and the
United States the right to receive, "frank, honest and unequivocal informa-
tion"1 22 in response to questions asked by immigration officers because these
questions give the government the opportunity to investigate and determine
the petitioner's eligibility and fitness for citizenship. 12 3
This emphasis on the crucial role of the investigation in granting the
precious status of citizenship resulted in a test for materiality of whether the
117. Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
118. The defendant had misrepresented his fulfillment of the residency requirement. Id. at
233. The Act of June 29, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 4, 34 Stat. 596, 597-99, required that an
applicant have maintained a permanent residence in the United States for at least five years
preceding the date of his application. A similar provision is found in the 1952 Act, which requires
physical presence totalling two and one half years during this five year period. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)
(1976); see note 58 supra.
119. See notes 124-32 infra and accompanying text.
120. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943) (United States citizenship is
"regarded as the highest hope of civilized men"); see, e.g., Corrado v. United States, 227 F.2d
780, 784 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956); United States v. Chandler, 152 F.
Supp. 169, 173 (D. Md. 1957); United States v. Marasilis, 142 F. Supp. 697, 699 tW.D. Mich.
1956); United States v. Lumantes, 139 F. Supp. 574, 575 (N.D. Cal. 1955), af'd per curiam, 232
F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1956).
121. Corrado v. United States, 227 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1955), cet. denied, 351 U S. 925
(1956).
122. United States v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 169, 172-73 (D. Md. 1957); United States v.
Genovese, 133 F. Supp. 820, 829 (D.N.J. 1955), aff'd sub non. United States v. Miontalbano, 236
F.2d 757 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 952 (1956); accord, Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S.
350 (1960). See generally United States v. Galato, 171 F. Supp. 169, 173 (M.D. Pa. 1959); United
States v. Lumantes, 139 F. Supp. 574, 575 (N.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 232 F.2d 216 (9th
Cir. 1956).
123. See cases cited note 122 supra. Failure to provide honest answers results in foredos-
ing paths of inquiry and denying the government the opportunity to investigate fully the
petitioner's qualifications. E.g., Stacher v. United States, 258 F.2d 112, 115 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 907 (1958); United States v. De Lucia, 256 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 836 (1958); Corrado v. United States, 227 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956); Sweet v. United States, 211 F.2d 118, 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 817 (1954); United States v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 169, 178 (D. Md. 1957); United
States v. Lumantes, 139 F. Supp. 574, 575 (N.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd per curian, 232 F.2d 216 (9th
Cir. 1956); United States v. Title, 132 F. Supp. 185, 195 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, 263 F.2d 28 (9th
Cir. 1959); see note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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true facts would have led to further investigation necessary to determine
eligibility. 124 In terms of actual procedure, the question has sometimes been
whether the truth would have led the officer to ask for additional information,
and then to refer the matter to the proper officer for further investigation. 125
Notably, the determination of the materiality of a misrepresented or con-
cealed fact was not based on the test that examined whether naturalization
would have been denied had the alien revealed the truth. 1 26 Thus, for
example, when the petitioner had falsely answered that he was married when
the fact of marriage would not have barred him from citizenship, the court
held the misrepresented fact material, and denaturalized the defendant. 127
When courts actually used that test for materiality, they did not need to
consider the thwarted investigation because the facts indicated that the truth
would have warranted denial.128 Frequently, however, such certainty was not
apparent, thereby resulting in speculation by courts having to make such a
determination. The Sixth Circuit condemned such speculation: "How could
any Government official or witness say whether or not citizenship would have
been denied [the petitioner] from an investigation . ..when no opportunity
for investigation was afforded?"' 29
The test for materiality, therefore, appears to have been broad. Although it
124. United States v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 169, 177 (D. Md. 1957); see cases cited note 123
supra; cf. United States v. Anastasio, 226 F.2d 912, 913-14 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 US.
931 (1956) (investigation was found not to have been prevented because examiner who approved
defendant's petition had defendant's file with record of previous arrests concealed by defendant).
Anastasio is somewhat similar on the facts to Chaunt, in which the Court found that the
government's failure to initiate an investigation based on facts that it was aware of indicated that
no investigation would have occurred had the defendant revealed his arrests. See notes 182-87
infra and accompanying text. A major difference is that in Chaunt, the defendant himself had
given the critical information to the government.
125. United States v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 169, 173 (D. Md. 1957). Another view
examined whether the government granted citizenship because the misrepresentation prevented
the inquiry that the truth would have necessitated. Corrado v. United States, 227 F.2d 780,
783-84 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956); United States v. Galato, 171 F. Supp.
169, 173 (M.D. Pa. 1959).
126. Corrado v. United States, 227 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925
(1956); United States v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 169, 176 (D. Md. 1957); accord, Stacher v.
United States, 258 F.2d 112, 119 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 907 (1958); United States v.
Montalbano, 236 F.2d 757, 759 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 952 (1956); United States v.
Galato, 171 F. Supp. 169, 172 (M.D. Pa. 1959); United States v. Lumantes, 139 F. Supp. 574,
575 (N.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 232 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Title, 132
F. Supp. 185, 195 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, 263 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1959).
127. United States v. Lumantes, 139 F. Supp. 574, 575 (N.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd per curiam,
232 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1956).
128. E.g., United States v. Marasilis, 142 F. Supp. 697 (W.D. Mich. 1956) (while Communist
Party membership alone is not a ground for denial, belief in overthrow of United States
government warrants denial and defendant admitted to having such a belief); United States v.
Accardo, 113 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiam, 208 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 952 (1954) (indictment at time of petition for conspiracy to defraud United States
through operation of an unregistered still would alone have warranted denial).
129. Corrado v. United States, 227 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925
(1956).
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went beyond the showing of a mere potential to thwart an investigation, 130 it
did not require a finding that the investigation might have revealed possible
grounds for denial, as long as any investigation was actually precluded. The
courts viewed the test's application as essential, because to decide otherwise
would mean "that one may deliberately engage in a falsehood concerning
required facts during naturalization proceedings without fear of consequences
so long as the truth, had it been revealed, would not have resulted in refusal
of citizenship. ' ' 131 Thus, the concern with the importance of the investigatory
function of the INS led to decisions holding material answers to all questions
that "the government thinks it important enough to ask."' 32
B. Deportation
As early as 1891, statutory authority existed to deport aliens for actions that
occurred prior to entry that would have made them excludable at entry. 133
Deportation case law concerning excludability at entry due to misrepresenta-
tion, however, developed prior to the enactment of the direct statutory
authority 134 that originally appeared in the DPA 13- and was codified in the-
Immigration and Nationality Act.' 3 6 The statutory ground for deportation
was similar to that for denaturalization because the majority of the denatural-
ization cases hinged on the materiality of the misrepresented or concealed
facts. 137 Although until 1966 the standard of persuasion required to deport
was lower than the standard required to denaturalize, 38 because the conse-
130. The mere potential to thwart an investigation or governmental function satisfies the test
for materiality in perjury cases under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976), and in criminal fraud cases under
8 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). See notes 90-102 supra and accompanying text.
131. United States v. Montalbano, 236 F.2d 757, 759 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 952
(1956); see United States v. Galato, 171 F. Supp. 169, 173 (M.D. Pa. 1959) (quoting Montalbano).
132. United States v. Montalbano, 236 F.2d 757, 759 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 952
(1956); see, e.g., United States v. Galato, 171 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1959).
133. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, §§ 1, 10, 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084, 1086. This act was
directed at aliens who had contracted to work in the United States. Id. § 1, 26 Star. at 1084. All
aliens who had entered to work in violation of the law were subject to deportation. Id. at §§ 10-
11, 26 Stat at 1086. Prior to this Act, deportation was directed mainly at misconduct after entry.
See Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570. Deportation of alien immigrants who were
excludable at the time of entry was provided for in the Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, §
19, 39 Stat. 874, 889. See generally 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 4.1a; Common
Council for Am. Unity, The Alien and the Immigration Law 185 (1972).
134. 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 4.7c, at 4-47; Fieldsteel, supra note 31, at
3; see United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 62 F.2d 808 (7th Cir.), aff'd, 289 U.S. 422 (1933);
United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1929).
135. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
136. 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 4.7c, at 4-48; see note 28 supra.
137. See notes 116-32 supra and accompanying text.
138. Until the decision in Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966), the standard of persuasion in
deportation cases was that of other civil cases-by the preponderance of the evidence. See note 88
supra. This view was based on the 1952 Act, which stated that "reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence" is required for the determination of deportability. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1OSa(a)(4),
1252(b)(4) (1976); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. at 281. The Supreme Court held that this language
referred to the quality of the evidence rather than to the burden of proof. Id. at 283. The Court
ruled that the burden required in denaturalization cases---that the government establish its
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quences of deportation had long been recognized as equally severe,139 similar
standards of materiality developed for deportation. ' 4 0
In early deportation cases, courts had no problem finding materiality when
it was clear that exclusion would have resulted from disclosure of the truth. 141
On the other hand, when the facts were not so clear, the proper standard of
materiality became a subject of conflict. 142 One view held a fact material only
if disclosure "would have been enough to justify the refusal of a visa or
exclusion upon entry.' 143 Another view followed the reasoning applied in
denaturalization cases and stressed the importance of the investigation
thwarted by the misrepresentation, regardless of what the inspection might
have uncovered. 144
In later cases, by apparently emphasizing the extreme importance of the
investigation into the alien's admissibility,145 courts considered a fact material
if the alien's misrepresentation frustrated a necessary investigation of eligibil-
ity that would have resulted from the truth. 146 The fact was considered
material even if it could be shown that no other facts would have been
-revealed in that investigation, 147 and regardless of whether it would have
affected the ultimate outcome.148 Thus, concealment of a previous deporta-
tion was held material because it would have suggested further inquiry,
although that fact alone would not have warranted exclusion. 149
Other courts adopted a middle approach. These courts narrowed the test by
requiring an additional showing that the precluded inquiry might have
resulted in the revelation of other facts that might have warranted denial. 150
For example, one court, applying this standard, ordered the deportation of a
resident alien because it found that concealment of an arrest that did not
clearly involve moral turpitude might have prevented the discovery of another
arrest. 15 1 A second court did not focus on the investigating officer's ultimate
decision, but, using a similar rationale, examined whether he would have
allegations by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence-should apply in deportation cases.
Id. at 285-86; see 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 5.10b, at 5-121.
139. See note 65 supra.
140. See notes 144-63 infra and accompanying text.
141. E.g., Hirose v. Berkshire, 73 F.2d 86 (9th Cir, 1934); Popa v. Zurbrick, 45 F.2d 583
(6th Cir. 1930); United States ex rel. Thomas v. Day, 29 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1928).
142. Appleman, supra note 31, at 268.
143. United States ex rel. Leibowitz v. Schlotfeldt, 94 F.2d 263, 265 (7th Cir. 1938)
(misrepresentation of identity) (quoting United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920, 921 (2d
Cir. 1929)); see United States ex rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920, 921 (2d Cir. 1929) (concealment of
arrests and imprisonment).
144. United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 62 F.2d 808, 811-12 (7th Cir.), qff'd, 289 U.S. 422
(1933) (alien falsely represented self as United States citizen).
145. E.g., Duran-Garcia v. Neelly, 246 F.2d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 1957); Ablett v. Brownell, 240
F.2d 625, 629-31 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Landon v. Clarke, 239 F.2d 631, 634-35 (1st Cir. 1956).
146. See cases cited note 145 supra.
147. Duran-Garcia v. Neelly, 246 F.2d 287, 291 (5th Cir. 1957).
148. Landon v. Clarke, 239 F.2d 631, 634 (1st Cir. 1956).
149. See Duran-Garcia v. Neelly, 246 F.2d 287, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1957).
150. Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625, 629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1957); United States ex rel.
Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1951).
151. Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625, 629-30 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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made a "temporary refusal, pending a further inquiry, the results of which
might well have prompted a final refusal."' s In a third case, the Ninth
Circuit held that proof that the alien might have gotten a visa on the true
facts did not vitiate the misrepresentation.IS3 A fourth court stated that "[ilt
might well be that any attempt to prove the [alien to be definitely excludable]
would have been unsuccessful. s"1 5 4 Rather, the combination of a precluded
investigation and the possibility that it might have led to a refusal was
sufficient to warrant a finding of materiality. ss Using this rationale, this
court refused to determine if the defendant was actually a homosexual'
s 6
because the investigation of his arrest for certain sexual acts would have led to
the attempt to exclude.157 Otherwise, to hold
that an alien may make a false statement in his application for a visa in order to avoid
the raising of a substantial question as to his eligibility and then, if he is caught in the
false statement after having successfully choked off investigation, may try out his
eligibility just as if nothing had happened would . . . be an invitation to false
swearing. 1
58
Such a rationale derives strong support from the congressional intent to
eliminate false swearing. 1s9 Although the Conference Committee report on the
Immigration and Nationality Act stressed the humanitarian aims of United
States immigration policy, it also indicated that the prevention of fraud,
perpetrated to avoid investigation of an alien's background, was an equally
important goal in protecting the United States' interests. 1
60
Another important rationale existed for emphasizing the relationship be-
tween the misrepresented fact and the investigation. Subsequently requiring
proof that the alien would have been excluded on the truth "would force the
courts into the realm of conjecture and speculation, in trying to make a
decision only the proper authorities could have capably made"16 1-a decision
152. United States ex rel. Jankowski v. Shaughnessy, 186 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1951)
(emphasis added); see Ablett v. Brownell, 240 F.2d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir. 19S7); Landon v. Clarke,
239 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1956).
153. Viruette Torres v. Hoy, 269 F.2d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 1959).
154. Ganduxe y Marino v. Murff, 183 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd sub nom.
Ganduxe y Marino v. Esperdy, 278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960).
155. Id.; see cases cited notes 144-52 supra. But see Calvillo v. Robinson, 271 F.2d 249, 253
(7th Cir. 1959) (rejects so-called "majority" rule because in those cases, the truth would actually
have warranted refusal of a visa).
156. An alien "afflicted with psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, or a mental defect" is
ineligible to receive a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1976). The Supreme Court has held that this
section was intended to exclude homosexuals and that it is constitutional. Boutilier v. INS, 387
U.S. 118 (1967).
157. Ganduxe y Marino v. Murff, 183 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd sub nom.
Ganduxe y Marino v. Esperdy, 278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960).
158. Id.; see 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 4.7c, at 4-60.
159. H.R. Rep. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 128, reprinted in (19521 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 1753, 1754 [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 2096]; see Appleman, supra note 31, at
267.
160. H.R. Rep. No. 2096, supra note 159, at 128, reprinted in [19521 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 1754.
161. Landon v. Clarke, 239 F.2d 631, 636 (1st Cir. 1956). The same concern about the need
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that the alien obstructed at the proper time. Such a theory supports the idea
that the proper time for investigation was the time of the original inquiry, and
not the time of the deportation hearing that might occur years later. 162 If an
alien now maintains that he was in fact admissible, he should have permitted
that determination to have been made when he had the burden of proving
admissibility. 163
IV. Chaunt v. United States
A. The Supreme Court Decision
Generally, by 1960, the decisions dealing with misrepresentation as a
ground for denaturalization or deportation viewed materiality in terms of the
effect of the misrepresented fact on the investigation. 164 This emphasis
accorded with the congressional concern that investigation of an applicant's
background not be circumvented by fraud. 16 5 In Chaunt v. United States, 166
the Supreme Court essentially reaffirmed these views by formulating a two
part test for materiality.
Chaunt had failed to reveal past arrests that, standing alone, were
insufficient to warrant denial of citizenship. 167 Although he had revealed his
membership in an allegedly communist affiliated organization, 161 the Gov-
ernment contended that revelation of the arrests would have led to the
discovery of Chaunt's other communist affiliations. 169 This information
would have led to further investigation of an alleged lack of attachment to the
to avoid speculation was expressed in denaturalization cases. See note 129 supra and accompany-
ing text.
162. E.g., Kassab v. INS, 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1966) (deportation hearings instituted seven
years after application for visa); Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961)
(deportation hearing nine years after visa application). The passage of time does not bar the
institution of deportation proceedings. See note 29 supra.
163. See United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-5602). Although the alien has the burden of proving
eligibility for a visa or citizenship, see notes 45, 57 supra and accompanying text, the burden of
proof is on the government to show that deportation or denaturalization is warranted. Woodby v.
INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
164. See notes 119-32, 144-63 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 159-60 supra and accompanying text.
166. 364 U.S. 350,(1960).
167. Chaunt had been arrested for distributing handbills in violation of an ordinance, for
making a public demonstration in violation of park regulations, and for a general breach of the
peace. The first charge was dropped; he received a suspended sentence for the second; the
conviction for the third charge was "nolled" on appeal. Id. at 352. The Court said that these
crimes were of "slight consequence" and did not involve the type of activity that would
disqualify one for citizenship. Id. at 354.
168. Chaunt disclosed that he had been a member of the International Workers' Order
(IWO). Id. at 355. The Court found that the Government knew the IWO was controlled by the
Communist Paqty when it granted Chaunt's petition for naturalization in 1940. Id.
169. -In 1929, Chaunt had been a district organizer for the Communist Party in Connecticut.
Id. at 354. It is unclear how the nature of the unrevealed arrests, see note 167 supra, would have
triggered an investigation revealing this affiliation. 364 U.S. at 354-55. The only possibility is that
Chaunt had been distributing communist handbills or orating on behalf of communism.
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United States Constitution, a possible ground for denying naturalization. 170
The Government argued, therefore, that this misrepresentation of his past
arrest record was material, thereby warranting revocation of citizenship. 17
The Ninth Circuit held that sufficient grounds for materiality and revocation
existed if the truth might have led the INS to make a further inquiry. 172 The
Supreme Court reversed, though it first acknowledged that
[flull and truthful response to all relevant questions required by the naturalization
procedure is, of course, to be exacted, and temporizing with the truth must be
vigorously discouraged. Failure to give frank, honest, and unequivocal answers ... is
a serious matter. Complete replies are essential so that the qualifications of the
applicant or his lack of them may be ascertained. 7 3
The Court noted the lack of "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"'1 4 evidence
showing either "that facts were suppressed which, if known, would have
warranted denial of citizenship or . . . that their disclosure might have been
useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts
warranting denial of citizenship."17 s Therefore, the Court held that Chaunt
should not be denaturalized.1 76
The Court's use of two tests was a recognition that although materiality
would be present if the truth would have warranted denial, the failure to meet
this standard1 77 does not automatically render the facts immaterial. A second
standard, that disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly
170. A petitioner must have been of "good moral character, attached to the principles of the
[United States Constitution] and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States." 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976). He must also swear to support and defend the Constitution. 8
U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1976); see notes 58, 60 supra and accompanying text. Prior to Chaunt, the
Government had argued that membership in the Communist Party at the time of naturalization
indicated a lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution because the Party advocated
the forcible overthrow of the United States government. In these cases, the grounds urged for
revocation were misrepresentation and illegal procurement because naturalization had been
procured in violation of statute. See Mfaisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670 (1958); Nowak v.
United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943); United
States v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 169 (D. Md. 1957); United States v. Iarasilis, 142 F. Supp. 697
(V.D. Mich. 1956). The Supreme Court has held, however, that mere membership in the Party is
not a ground to establish illegal procurement of citizenship. Rather, it is necessary to prove that
the defendant himself knew that overthrow was a goal of the Party and that he believed in that
goal. Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660, 665-68 (1958); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118, 136, 140, 145-56 (1943).
171. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 354 (1960); 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976).
172. 270 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1959). The cases cited for this proposition, however, seemed to
have based their findings of materiality on the premise that an investigation would have occurred.
See notes 124-25, 130 supra and accompanying text. The holding's omission of reference to the
possibility of the investigation leading to a denial was in accord with the general view that the
mere preclusion of an investigation alone was sufficient for a finding of materiality. Id.; see notes
130-32 supra and accompanying text.
173. 364 U.S. at 352.
174. Id. at 353; see note 39 supra and accompanying text.
175. 364 U.S. at 355.
176. Id.
177. The first test was not satisfied in Chaunt because his arrests would not have justified
denial. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
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leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship, must
be applied before resolving the question of materiality. The second test seems
to assume that an investigation occurred. This indicates that showing that an
investigation would' 78 have taken place is required, and overrules the "might"
test used by the Ninth Circuit. Such an interpretation is supported by the
Court's elaboration of this test as whether the truth "might have led to the
discovery of other facts which would justify denial,' 179 because possible
discovery of other facts would naturally occur only upon further investigation.
The added requirement of an investigation "possibly leading to the discov-
ery of other facts warranting denial" further narrowed the holding of the
Ninth Circuit and of the preceding denaturalization cases.18 0 The use of the
word "possibly" indicates that it is not necessary to show that the investiga-
tion would have definitely led to the discovery of other facts. 181 In Chaunt,
the possibility of such other facts did exist, because an investigation of his
minor arrests might have revealed the defendant's communist connections, a
178. The requirement of showing that an investigation would have taken place leads to the
question of what kind of evidence would be necessary to prove that it would have occurred. In
tort and contract law, materiality is viewed in terms of the effect a misrepresentation would have
on the reasonable person. See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text. Immigration cases do
not actually refer to whether the reasonable immigration or consular officer would have initiated
further investigation. The indication, however, is that the reasonable person standard would
apply to immigration law as well. Evidence in these cases consists largely of testimony by
naturalization examiners. Since it is unlikely that the examiner actually remembers a particular
application, he usually testifies as to regular practice and procedure in conducting the Inquiry. If
he is dead, other officials testify as to regular practice. 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note
26, § 20.5d, at 20-35; see United States v. D'Agostino, 338 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1964); United States
v. Rossi, 319 F.2d 701, 702 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1963);
United States v. Profaci, 274 F.2d 289, 291 (2d Cir. 1960); Stacher v. United States, 258 F.2d 112
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 907 (1958); United States v. Montalbano, 236 F.2d 757, 759 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 952 (1956).
At first glance, the holding in Chaunt might appear to be based on a subjective test because
the Court found that an investigation was not actually precluded. See notes 184-87 itfra and
accompanying text. The reasonable person must be viewed, however, in the context of the
circumstances surrounding the misrepresentation. In Chaunt, no investigation ensued although
the defendant had revealed membership in an organization known to be communist affiliated.
The reasonable officer, charged with the necessity of determining the applicant's attachment to
the Constitution, see note 170 supra, who did not investigate on the basis of such an obvious
communist connection, would most likely not have investigated an applicant's communist
affiliations on the tenuous ground of an arrest for leafleting.
179. 364 U.S. at 353.
180. See note 130 supra and accompanying text. The addition is in accord with the holdings
of certain deportation cases. See notes 150-57 supra and accompanying text.
181. In Chaunt, an investigation might have led to the fact that the defendant was actually
committed to the overthrow of the United States government. Such a commitment would have
indicated nonattachment to the Constitution and would, therefore, have been a bar to naturaliza-
tion. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976); see notes 58, 60, 170 supra. The ultimate determination of an
investigation of the defendant's affiliations, however, might have shown that he was eligible for
naturalization. The significance of the test is that a ground for denial might have been revealed;
the ultimate determination, however, is irrelevant to the test. See United States v. Fedorenko,
597 F.2d 946, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No.
79-5602).
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potential ground for revocation of citizenship. 18 2 The Court, however, never
had to deal with this possibility. It first stated that Chaunt had voluntarily
revealed his membership in an organization that, the Court found, the
government knew to be communist affiliated.18 3 The Court then noted that
while the "nexus with the Communist Party . . . was thereby disclosed and
was available for further investigation if it had been deemed appropriate at
that time," 18 4 the Government failed to investigate this membership, a re-
vealed and far "less tenuous" connection with the Communist Party than the
minor arrests.18 5 The Court acknowledged that had membership in that
organization not been disclosed, the misrepresentation would have taken on
greater significance because there would have been nothing else to indicate to
the Government the need to investigate. 1 6 The failure to investigate the
membership, however, indicated that there would have been no additional
inquiry into those connections on the basis of an insignificant arrest record;
therefore, no investigation was precluded.1 8 7 Further analysis leads to the
conclusion that the "other facts" to which an investigation would have led
were facts already known to the government because of Chaunt's own
revelations. Because Chaunt was granted citizenship without investigation,
despite the government's knowledge, it does not appear that the facts were
considered material to the inquiry at the time.
Confusion arose immediately as to the meaning of this second test. In his
dissent, Justice Clark appeared to have misunderstood the substance of the
majority opinion. He argued that Chaunt should have been denaturalized
because his "falsification . . . forestalled an investigation which might have
resulted in the defeat of [his] application for naturalization.' 8  Although
Justice Clark's language differs, it is hard to distinguish this test from the test
developed by the majority. Both required a thwarted investigation and the
possibility that the investigation might have led to denial of naturalization.
The dispute actually seems to have centered on the factual question of the
Government's knowledge of Chaunt's communist affiliations. Justice Clark
believed the facts indicated that the Government did not know at the time
that the organization Chaunt belonged to was communist affiliated. There-
fore, he believed that concealment of the arrests actually forestalled an
investigation of his communist connections. 189
B. The Attorney General's Interpretation
An opinion rendered by the Attorney General in 1961 supports the interpre-
tation that the second test of Chaunt requires proof that the truth would have
led to an investigation that might have revealed facts warranting denial. 19'
182. See note 181 supra.
183. See note 168 supra and accompanying text.
184. 364 U.S. at 355.
185. Id.; see notes 167, 169 supra.
186. 364 U.S. at 355; see note 181 supra.
187. 364 U.S. at 355; see note 169 supra. For this interpretation, see United States v.
Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19,
1980) (No. 79-5602); note 275 inftra and accompanying text.
188. 364 U.S. at 357 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
189. Id.
190. In re S- & B-C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1168 (1961).
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Pursuant to the authority granted him in the Immigration and Nationality
Act,1 91 the Attorney General formulated a two part test of materiality, based
on the Chaunt holding, for use in deportation cases. He stated that the Act's
objectives would best be effected by finding materiality if "the alien is
excludable on the true facts, or . . .the misrepresentation tends to shut off a
line of inquiry which is relevant to the alien's eligibility and which might well
have resulted in a proper determination that he be excluded."' 192
The Attorney General elaborated on this second test and broke it down
into two parts. First, it must be determined whether the misrepresentation
foreclosed a line of inquiry relevant to eligibility. 193 In accordance with
Chaunt, 194 more than a "remote, tenuous, or fanciful connection" between the
misrepresentation and the investigation is required. 195 This implies that such
a remote connection underlies the holding in Chaunt. 196 If it is now deter-
mined that an inquiry was precluded, 197 the second step examines whether
that inquiry might have resulted in a "proper determination that the alien be
excluded."' 98 The Attorney General went further than the Supreme Court did
in Chaunt by elaborating on the meaning of "might." He explained that any
misrepresentation may potentially cut off some opportunity for investigation.
The failure of an investigation to suggest even the existence of any ground of
exclusion, however, would preclude a finding of materiality. 199 Additionally,
the Attorney General indicated that more than the mere possibility of the
investigation revealing other facts warranting denial is required to find
materiality. Under his test, materiality is present only if the facts revealed
indicate a substantial question as to eligibility. 200 This requirement should be
191. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976). Determinations by the Attorney General on questions of law
are controlling. Id.; see note 40 supra.
192. 9 I. & N. Dec. at 447.
193. Id. at 448.
194. 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960).
195. 9 I. & N. Dec. at 448-49.
196. See notes 182-87 supra and accompanying text.
197. No inquiry was cut off in Chaunt. See notes 184-87 supra and accompanying text.
198. 9 I. & N. Dec. at 449.
199. Id. at 449-50; see Appleman, supra note 31, at 274.
200. 9 I. & N. Dec. at 449-50; accord, Ganduxe y Marino v. Murff, 183 F. Supp. 565, 567
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd sub nom. Ganduxe y Marino v. Esperdy, 278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960) (substantial question of eligibility). The Attorney General's require-
ment that the precluded investigation suggest a substantial question of eligibility, rather than a
mere possibility of other facts warranting denial, may have been intended to avoid speculation.
One could always say there is a possibility, however remote, that an investigation might reveal a
fact bearing on eligibility. This type of conjecture leads to a test that focuses mainly on the
precluded investigation and that is reminiscent of pre-Chaunt holdings. See notes 124-32,
145-49 supra and accompanying text. The additional emphasis on substantial questions of
eligibility narrows the test to comport with the severity of deportation and denaturalization.
Notably, the Attorney General intended that this narrower test apply to deportation which, at the
time, required a lower standard of persuasion than that required for denaturalization. See note
138 supra and accompanying text. Additionally, in denaturalization, actual loss of the precious
right of citizenship is at stake. See note 65 supra and accompanying text. The Attorney General
opinion, therefore, should also influence the determination of materiality in denaturalization
cases.
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incorporated, for several reasons, into the immigration test of materiality.
First, the severity of denaturalization and deportation 20 ' demands a standard
higher than that connoted by "possibly." Second, the language of this higher
standard clarifies the court's task of determining whether the facts now
revealed are material by minimizing the speculation that the use of "possibly"
entails.
The Attorney General's requirement that a substantial question of eligibility
exist caused him to reverse a Board of Immigration Appeals' holding that the
use of a false name in procuring a visa constituted a misrepresentation of a
material fact regardless of whether it concealed grounds of ineligibility. 202
The Attorney General acknowledged that the alien's failure to give his true
name precluded an investigation. 20 3 He also recognized, however, that if the
alien had given his real name, there would have been no possibility that the
resulting investigation might have revealed any grounds for exclusion. 20°
Therefore, under the second test, the Attorney General determined that the
alien had not misrepresented a material fact.2 05
The opinion also differentiated the second test from the first by implying
that unlike the proof required by the first test, it is unnecessary to show that
this substantial question would have been ultimately resolved in the govern-
ment's favor. "In close cases the government ought not be required to
speculate as to what would have been the results of an investigation which the
alien has prevented. ' 20 The reluctance to speculate is in accord with the
concern expressed by courts prior to Chaunt.0 7 This reluctance should be
embodied in the second test by further refining "possibly leading to other facts
warranting denial." In addition to requiring that the investigation would have
revealed facts posing a substantial question of eligibility, 2 8 the second test for
materiality should be satisfied as long as the investigation might have resulted
in a determination of ineligibility.
The application of the Attorney General's test resulted in the reversal of
another administrative decision .209 In that case, the alien had not revealed his
membership in the Hungarian Communist Party when he applied for a
visa. 210 In subsequent deportation proceedings, he claimed that he had been
an involuntary member. The hearing board determined that his misrepresen-
tation was not material because only voluntary membership would have
resulted in exclusion .2 1  The Attorney General reversed because the truth
201. See note 65 supra.
202. In re B-C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1168, at 441-44 (1961). The Board cited a previous decision
in which the Attorney General approved a holding that identity is always material. In re B- & P-,
2 I. & N. Dec. 638, 645 (1947).
203. In re B-C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1168, at 450 (1961). This finding satisfied the first step in the
Attorney General's breakdown of the second test.
204. Id. at 450-51.
205. Id. at 451.
206. 9 I. & N. Dec. at 450; see Appleman, supra note 31, at 274.
207. See notes 129, 161 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 200-01 supra and accompanying text.
209. In re S-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1168, at 436, 441 (1961).
210. Id. at 437.
211. Id. at 440.
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would have led to an investigation into the voluntary nature of his member-
ship, thereby raising a substantial question of eligibility. It was unnecessary
under the test, however, to decide the question of voluntary membership and,
therefore, whether exclusion would have actually resulted. 2 12 The test focuses
on the possibility of that result, not on its inevitability.
213
The Attorney General's opinion pointed out that the test comported with
the congressional intent that immigration law and the investigation of aliens'
backgrounds not be circumvented by fraud. 21 4 The Attorney General also
stated that his test was supported by the congressional creation of an
independent ground of exclusion for misrepresentation. 21S Insistence that
an alien be deportable for misrepresentation only if the truth would have
made him ineligible would effectively render the independent ground mean-
ingless and add nothing to the list of grounds for exclusion. 2 16
V. PosT-Chaunt CASE LAW
A. Deportation
Generally, post-Chaunt deportation case law has followed the Attorney
General's interpretation of the second test.21 7 Thus, when an alien failed to
212. Id. at 450. The question of the voluntariness of membership in a suspect organization
frequently arises as a possible ground for deportation or denaturalization. Most cases have held
that the determination of whether membership was voluntary should occur at the time of
application. E.g., United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979) (denaturalization of
alleged Nazi war criminal), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-5602);
Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961) (deportation of former Communist Party
member); sev Fieldsteel, supra note 31, at 6. See also Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U.S. 630
(1967) (petition for naturalization denied); In re Ferenci, 217 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
(petition for naturalization granted).
213. Appleman, supra note 31, at 271-72.
214. In re S- & B-C-, 9 1. & N. Dec. 1168, at 446 (1961). The Attorney General was referring
to H.R. Rep. No. 2096, supra note 159, at 128, reprinted in [1952] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 1754. See Appleman, supra note 31, at 267.
215. 9 1. & N. Dec. at 446, referring to grounds listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976); see note 28
supra.
216. 9 I. & N. Dec. at 444; accord, Fieldsteel, supra note 31, at 3. One could possibly extend
this argument to denaturalization. The two grounds on which a suit for revocation of citizenship
can be instituted are misrepresentation and illegal procurement. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976); see
note 29 supra. Revocation on proof that the naturalized citizen would have been denied
citizenship for such a failure could be based on illegal procurement because illegal procurement
refers to the failure to meet statutory requirements. Misrepresentation may then be a separate
ground for revocation requiring a different test.
217. See Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417, 431 & n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Langham-
mer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642, 648 (1st Cir. 1961); Appleman, supra note 31, at 272. The
Castaneda-Gonzalez court said that this test was the one typically applied in immigration, tort,
contract, and securities law. 564 F.2d at 431 n.29. It did not use this test, however, because It
had to employ a test provided in a labor regulation since the misrepresentation affected the
acquisition of a labor certificate. Id. at 431; see notes 238-40 infra and accompanying text; cf.
Kassab v. INS, 364 F.2d 806, 807 (6th Cir. 1966) (materiality present if the truth might have led
to further action and the discovery of other facts). See also Suite v. INS, 594 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.
1979) (defendant's contention that misrepresentation was not material because falsified documents
were not necessary to issuance of visa held to be without merit).
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reveal membership in the East German Communist Party,2 1 8 and in deporta-
tion proceedings claimed that his membership had been involuntary so that
disclosure would not have ultimately resulted in exclusion, 219 the First Circuit
held the concealed fact material. 220 The court stated that even if it was
now determined that the alien had been an involuntary member, such a deter-
mination would not render his omission immaterial because the precluded
investigation would have unearthed facts raising a question as to eligibility.22,
The court stressed that an alien cannot avoid such a question by misrepresen-
tation and subsequently expect the court to determine his eligibility as if no
wrongdoing had occurred.2 2 2 The implication is that any such question should
have been resolved at the time of the original investigation. 2 23 This view is
especially significant when the passage of time has rendered more difficult the
government's burden of proving materiality by clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing evidence.
2 24
In Kassab v. INS, 225 the Sixth Circuit held that materiality exists if the
truth might have led to further inquiry and the discovery of facts warranting
exclusion. 22 6 This test is similar to the broad one used in the Ninth Circuit's
disposition of Chaunt,2 " which the Supreme Court narrowed by requiring a
demonstration that an investigation would have taken place.2 2 8 The Sixth
Circuit's decision, however, ultimately comported with the Supreme Court's
holding in Chaunt because Kassab was based on a finding that the visa
application would have been held in abeyance pending further inquiry. 22 9
Chaunt has erroneously been cited for the proposition that a fact is material
218. Membership in a communist party, before or at entry, is a ground for exclusion, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(C) (1976), and therefore subjects the alien to deportation. 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(1) (1976); see note 28 supra. If the alien can establish to the satisfaction of the consular
officer that membership was involuntary;, or while under the age of sixteen; or in order to obtain
employment and essentials of living; or that the alien has altered his beliefs, he may be found
eligible for a visa. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(1) (1976).
219. See note 218 supra.
220. Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642, 648 (1st Cir. 1961). The same fact pattern and
holding is found in United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-5602), and in In re S-, 9 1. & N. Dec. 1168 (1961).
See notes 209-13 supra, 259-88 infra and accompanying text.
221. 295 F.2d at 648.
222. Id. (citing Ganduxe y Marino v. Murff, 183 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd
sub nom. Ganduxe y Marino v. Esperdy, 278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824
(1960)); see In re S- & B-C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1168, at 449-50 (1961).
223. See notes 129, 161, 207 supra and accompanying text.
224. Id. In 1966, the Supreme Court ruled that the government's burden of proof in
deportation cases is by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence," the same standard required
in denaturalization cases. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966); see notes 39, 138 supra and
accompanying text.
225. 364 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1966).
226. Id. at 807.
227. Chaunt v. United States, 270 F.2d- 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 364 U.S. 350 (1960);
see note 172 supra and accompanying text.
228. 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960); see notes 175-87 supra and accompanying text.
229. Kassab v. INS, 364 F.2d 806, 807 (6th Cir. 1966); see notes 175-79 supra and
accompanying text. The visa application would have been suspended pending determination of
the defendant's marital status. 364 F.2d at 807.
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only if the truth would have resulted in exclusion. In La Madrid-Peraza v.
INS, 230 an alien overstated wages she was to receive in her prospective
employment in attempting to meet the prevailing wage rate for admission. 2
3 1
The Ninth Circuit ruled that under Chaunt, a misrepresented or concealed
fact is not material unless the truth would have justified a refusal to issue a
visa.232 Because no evidence indicated that she was actually paid less than the
required rate, she was not deported. 233
The holding in La Madrid-Peraza ignores the existence of the second
standard of materiality in Chaunt. The Ninth Circuit overlooked a basic
reason why it had been reversed by the Supreme Court in Chaunt -the Ninth
Circuit had used a "might" test 234 in reference to investigation, while the
Supreme Court narrowed it to a "would" test accompanied by the existence of
a possibility of a determination of ineligibility. 23s Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit test bears no relation to the carefully formulated opinion of the
Attorney General, 236 that should be controlling. 237 In fact, it appears that
immateriality could have been found, because although an investigation of the
alien would have occurred, there was apparently no possibility that other
facts warranting denial, or any substantial question regarding her eligibility,
might have been discovered. Because issuance of a labor certificate was the
crux of the case, however, the decision revolved around a definition of
materiality found in the labor regulations. 238 Therefore, while the court cited
the Chaunt test as the controlling authority, it actually employed a test




Denaturalization cases since Chaunt have steadfastly continued to protect
citizenship once it has been granted. 24 1 In determining materiality, the cases
have stressed that the severity of the penalty demands that the government
230. 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974).
231. Id. at 1297-98.
232. Id. at 1298.
233. Id.
234. See note 172 supra and accompanying text.
235. See notes 175-79 supra and accompanying text.
236. In re S- & B-C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1168 (1961); see pt. IV(B) supra.
237. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976); see notes 40, 191 supra.
238. La Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir. 1974). The regulation In
question provided its own test for materiality: whether "if the correct facts had been known a
certification could not have been issued." 29 C.F.R. § 60.5(g) (1972).
239. 492 F.2d at 1298; see 29 C.F.R. § 60.5(g) (1972).
240. A similar situation was presented in a later case involving the same regulation.
Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The District of Columbia Circuit,
however, recognized that because of the regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 60.5(g) (1972), it had to follow a
different test than the one normally used in immigration and other areas of law. 564 F.2d at
431 n.29, 431-32; see note 217 supra.
241. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 269 (1961); United States v. D'Agostino, 338
F.2d 490, 491 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied 375
U.S. 833 (1963); United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1962).
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establish its case by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. 24 2 The
judicial protection of naturalized citizens has resulted in construing the law,
as far as is reasonably possible, in favor of the citizen.2 43
In many post-Chaunt denaturalization cases, it was clear that on the true
facts, the defendant would have been denied citizenship, and, therefore, use
of the second test was unnecessary. 2 " In the absence of facts inevitably
warranting denial, the Supreme Court's formulation of a second Chaunt
test 245 indicated the necessity for further consideration of materiality. Less
than two years after its decision in Chaunt had been reversed, however, the
Ninth Circuit held that the test for materiality was whether the truth would
have led to denial of citizenship. 246 In United States v. Rossi,2 47 an alien had
given his brother's name as his own because he feared the quota for his native
country had been filled. 24" The government offered no proof, beyond the
personal opinion of the defendant, that the quota had been oversubscribed,
nor did it show any other possible grounds for denial.2 49 The court explained
that while the Supreme Court had condemned " 'temporizing with the
truth,' ",250 it "did not regard [all retreats] from rectitude as sufficient ... to
strip [one] of citizenship," 251 and it therefore altered the test for materiality. 2s2
Although the Ninth Circuit cited the two tests,25 3 it proceeded to hold that a
finding of materiality is warranted only if the truth would have resulted in a
determination of ineligibility.25 4 Thus, the court applied only the first test in
242. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
243. United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943)).
244. E.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961) (defendant had been engaged in the
criminal profession of bootlegging); United States v. Riela, 337 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1964) (defendant
failed to meet all statutory requirements of lawful admission and residency); United States v.
Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (defendant allegedly had been a Gestapo agent who
commited atrocities), rev'd and remanded on presentation of newly discovered evidence, Nos.
79-1587, 79-1140 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 1980); United States v. Wisdom, 320 F. Supp. 286 (E.D.
Tenn. 1970) (defendant had been a bigamist at the time he filed his petition for naturalization). In
Walus, the defendant's citizenship was not revoked because of illegal entry under the Displaced
Persons Act, Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended by Act of June
16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219, but because of misrepresentation, and because he was
held to have lacked the good moral character requisite for citizenship. 453 F. Supp. at 7 15-16; see
8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976). The court, in its discretion, examined the defendant's acts prior to the
statutory periods. 453 F. Supp. at 716; see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) (1976).
245. See notes 175-81 supra and accompanying text.
246. United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1962).
247. 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962).
248. Rossi was a native of Italy, a country that was subject to annual quota restrictions.
Id. at 650-5 1. His- deceased brother was born in Chile, which, like other South American
countries at the time, was not subject to such restrictions. Id. at 651. Fearing that the Italian
quota would exclude him from entry into the United States, he used his brother's name when
applying for a visa. Id. at 651, 653.
249. Id. at 653-54.




254. Id. at 652-53.
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refusing to order Rossi's deportation. Proper application of the second test
would have achieved the same result because the government failed to present
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence either that the use of Rossi's real
name would have led to any investigation, or that any question of eligibility
might have been revealed. 25 - Although the result was not erroneous, the
Ninth Circuit inaccurately stated the proper test.
Other decisions dealing with misrepresentation in denaturalization situa-
tions in which it was not clear that a visa would have been denied have
employed the second test;25 6 several of these decisions have also recognized
that the Supreme Court refused to denaturalize Chaunt because, on the facts,
no investigation would have occurred. 2S7 The Second Circuit has held that
even though the truth itself would not provide a sufficient ground for the
denial of citizenship, the fact is material if the misrepresentation "closes to the
Government an avenue of enquiry which might conceivably lead to collateral
255. Id. at 653-54. Apparently, the only evidence that the quota for Italy had been filled was
the personal testimony of the defendant himself. No other proof was offered, nor was there any
contention that the use of his true name might have led to the discovery of other facts bearing on
eligibility.
256. E.g., United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 950-52 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-5602); United States v. D'Agostino, 338 F,2d 490,
491 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115, 118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833
(1963); United States v. Trifa, No. 5-70924, slip. op. at 14-15 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 1979) (order
denying motion for summary judgment); United States v. Bimba, 233 F. Supp. 966, 971-72
(E.D.N.Y. 1964).
Cases in which naturalization itself is the issue have also dealt with the question of materiality.
One of the categories warranting a finding that the petitioner lacks the good moral character
required for citizenship is the giving of false testimony to obtain any benefits under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (1976). If a petitioner is found to have
given false testimony, his petition may be denied. Misrepresentation in naturalization, however,
presents a qualitatively different situation than that presented by deportation or denaturalization.
First, a denial of a petition does not carry with it any of the drastic consequences implicit in
stripping a person of citizenship or expelling him from the United States. Second, denial of a
petition for naturalization does not act as a perpetual bar to naturalization. The petitioner may
renew his application if he can later prove his eligibility. 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note
26, § 16.12, at 16-66. On the other hand, because the status of American citizenship is so precious
and cannot easily be revoked, "the Government has a strong and legitimate interest in ensuring
that only qualified persons are granted citizenship." Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U.S. 630,
637 (1967); see 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 14.3, at 14-15. This interest is
enhanced by the lack of a statutory requirement that the testimony be material, Any false answer
is sufficient to warrant the denial of citizenship, and strict compliance with statutory provisions Is
required. See Kovacs v. United States, 476 F.2d 843, 8e5 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Haniatakis, 376
F.2d 728, 730-31-(3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 914 (S.D. Fla.
1978), rev'd, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980)
(No. 79-5602); 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra note 26, § 15.15b, at 15-49. Nevertheless,
some courts have read a materiality requirement into the statute and have employed the second
Chaunt test. E.g., In re Yao Quinn Lee, 480 F.2d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1973); Klig v. United States,
296 F.2d 343, 346-47 (2d Cir. 1961); In re Sotos, 221 F. Supp. 145, 147-48 (W.D. Pa. 1963); In re
Ferenci, 217 F. Supp. 714, 716-17 (E.D. Pa. 1963). But see In re Haniatakis, 376 F.2d 728, 730
(3d Cir. 1967) (immaterial facts include those that effectively cut off a "line of inquiry which
might have revealed further facts bearing on the petitioner's eligibility for citizenship.").
257. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No. 79-5602); United States v. Bimba, 233 F. Supp. 966,
972 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); see notes 182-87 supra and accompanying text.
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information of greater relevance. '2- 8 Information of greater relevance can
easily be seen as facts that posed questions of eligibility or that might have led
to denial.
In United States v. Fedorenko,25 9 the Fifth Circuit denaturalized a Ukrai-
nian-born citizen who admitted that he had lied about his whereabouts and
activities during World War II when he applied for a visa under the DPA.
260
Although he had maintained that he had been a farmer and factory worker
for the Germans as a prisoner of war, he had neglected to inform the
consular official that he had also been a guard at the concentration camp in
Treblinka.26 1 The defendant claimed that his false statement was not material
because his guard service had been involuntary, and therefore, the truth of his
whereabouts would not have ultimately resulted in the denial of a visa under
the DPA. 262 The district court refused to denaturalize him. It held that no
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence had been presented to prove that
he would have been excludable, either because he had served voluntarily, or
because he had committed atrocities. 263 The court attempted to deal with the
second test, but found a stumbling block in the meaning of "possibly leading
to the discovery of other facts warranting denial. '264 By reasoning that the
Supreme Court did not say "leading to facts which might have warranted
denial," the court maintained that the word "possibly" did not refer to the
existence of such facts, but rather that their existence is presupposed.
261
Consequently, the court held that facts warranting denial must be proved to
have existed. 266 Such an interpretation completely vitiates the second test by
requiring, for both tests, proof of facts warranting denial. It effectively deletes
"possibly" by ignoring what the word literally connotes--that there be a
chance that such facts exist.
267
258. United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115, 118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963)
(citations omitted).
259. 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (No.
79-5602), rev'g 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
260. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009; see notes 1-22 supra and
accompanying text.
261. 597 F.2d at 948.
262. The Displaced Persons Act excluded war criminals and those who assisted the enemy in
persecuting civilian populations, among others. See notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
Fedorenko's contention is similar to unsuccessful claims by other aliens that the involuntary
nature of their activities rendered their misrepresentations immaterial. See Langhammer v.
Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (Ist Cir. 1961); In re S- & B-C-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 1168 (1961); see notes
210-13, 218-23 supra and accompanying text.
263. 455 F. Supp. at 915-17.
264. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960).
265. 455 F. Supp. at 915-16; see note 181 supra and accompanying text.
266. 455 F. Supp. at 916.
267. See note 181 supra and accompanying text. The district court relied on three cases. First,
it used the Ninth Circuit's holding in United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1962);
see notes 246-54 supra and accompanying text. Second, it followed a denaturalization case that
found it unnecessary to deal with the second test because the truth clearly would have justified
denial. United States v. Riela, 337 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1964); see note 244 supra and accompanying
text. Third, it cited a Ninth Circuit deportation case that relied on a definition of materiality
found in a labor regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 60.5(g) (1972), and not on immigration law tests. La
Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974); see notes 230-40 supra and accompanying
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The Fifth Circuit reversed in Fedorenko, 268 holding that the district court's
interpretation of the second test was wrong as a matter of law. 269 First, the
court acknowledged the disagreement concerning the interpretation of
Chaunt, and recognized that the language of the test lent itself to some
ambiguity. 270 It noted that requiring the government first to prove the
existence of ultimate facts that would alone justify denial of citizenship
would render the second test meaningless by necessitating the same require-
ment as that posed by the first test.271 The Fifth Circuit implied that the
Supreme Court had never intended such an interpretation, by ruling that
"possibly" means only that the government must prove by clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence that the investigation the government would have
made might have uncovered other facts warranting denial. 272
Second, the court noted the grave consequences attendant on losing citizen-
ship, 273 and stated that the other narrowing factor in the second test was the
requirement that the government prove that investigation would have oc-
curred, not the "less stringent alternative" of proof that it might have
occurred. 274 The Fifth Circuit recognized that the key to the refusal to
denaturalize Chaunt was not that he would not have been denied citizenship
on the truth, but that there was no basis for believing that the government
would have made an inquiry if Chaunt had revealed his minor arrest
record.27 S In contrast, the evidence in Fedorenko indicated that there cer-
tainly would have been an investigation. A former vice-consul, who had been
active in administrating the DPA, 276 testified that at the time, vice-consuls
believed as a matter of law that concentration camp guards were ineligible for
visas under the DPA. 277 If there had been any indication that Fedorenko had
been involved with any concentration camp, the vice-consul would have
stopped the case, suspended approval, and called for further investigation. 278
text. Curiously, while the court considered Rossi, it refused to consider another deportation case,
Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1961), that used the second test properly, on
the ground that it was not a denaturalization case. 455 F. Supp. at 916; see notes 218-22 supra
and accompanying text. The court also overlooked the existence of the Second Circuit view. See
United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963); note 258 s31pra
and accompanying text.
268. 597 F.2d 946, 947 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980)
(No. 79-5602).
269. Id. at 951.
270. Id. at 950-51.
271. Id. at 947, 950-51; see note 181 supra and accompanying text.
272. 597 F.2d at 951.
273. See note 65 supra.
274. 597 F.2d at 952 n.6.
275. Id. at 951; see notes 182-87 supra and accompanying text.
276. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009.
277. 597 F.2d at 952-53.
278. Id. at 953 n.7. The vice-consul testified that vice-consuls at the time considered
concentration camp service to be "a contradiction in terms [and] no person who was discovered to
have been a guard ever attempted to convince the vice-consuls that his service had been
involuntary; instead . . . these persons admitted that they had chosen to undertake that service
rather than go into forced labor divisions because the life of a guard was more comfortable." Id.
at 952. This type of testimony, revealing the customary and invariable practice of officers Issuing
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The evidence indicated that a substantial question as to his eligibility existed;
therefore, if it was now determined that investigation would have revealed
that Fedorenko was actually serving involuntarily, this ultimate determina-
tion would not prevent a finding that the facts Fedorenko misrepresented
were material.
279
Finally, in reaching its holding in Fedorenko, the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered the ramifications of the contrary interpretations espoused in the district
court 28 0 and in the Ninth Circuit.28 I Determining materiality on the basis of
the first test alone would allow an applicant for a visa or citizenship to avoid
questions of eligibility by "[lying] about his background and thereby [preven-
ting] the government from investigating his fitness at a time when he has the
burden of proving [it]."' 28 2 Therefore, because his deception has been discov-
ered, the government would be required to conduct an investigation of the
past, discover ultimate facts warranting ineligibility, and prove those facts by
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence years later. 283
The court further stated that Fedorenko's claim that his guard service at
Treblinka had been involuntary came thirty years too late. 284 Clearly, if he
had had nothing to hide, as he now asserted, he should have revealed the
truth thirty years ago when the government could have capably conducted a
thorough and timely investigation. 28 5 To hold otherwise would mean that "an
applicant with something to hide would have everything to gain and nothing
to lose by lying under oath to the INS. '286 This contention is in accord with
that expressed in other cases in which the defendants claimed involuntary
membership in communist organizations. 28 7 Those courts found not only that
visas at the time, is the type of evidence indicating a reasonable person standard of materiality.
See note 178 supra. In addition, the use of testimony to show that the granting of a visa would
have been suspended pending investigation is in line with the holdings in other cases. See notes
125, 152 supra and accompanying text.
279. 597 F.2d at 950-51.
280. 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
281. United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962).
282. 597 F.2d at 951. The applicant for a visa under the Displaced Persons Act had the
burden of proving eligibility. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013;
see note 18 supra. Similarly, under the 1952 Act, an applicant has the burden of proving
eligibility for a visa, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976), and for citizenship, 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1976); see notes
45, 57 and accompanying text.
283. 597 F.2d at 951. The passage of time does not bar the institution of denaturalization
proceedings. See note 29 supra. In cases dealing with former Nazi war criminals, the passage of
time poses a uniform and serious problem for the government-a problem that the defendant
can easily take advantage of. Thirty-five to forty years have passed since the events affecting
eligibility occurred. Witnesses, if still alive, are old, may have failing memories, and may live
abroad. Their testimony, and any other evidence that the defendant committed atrocities or acted
voluntarily may be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S.
265, 283 (1961).
284. 597 F.2d at 953.
285. Id. Courts dealing with deportation and denaturalization have indicated their concern
that speculation be avoided. See notes 129, 161 supra and accompanying text.
286. 597 F.2d at 951; see Ganduxe y Marino v. Murff, 183 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), affid sub nom. Ganduxe y Marino v. Esperdy, 278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 824 (1960).
287. See notes 210-13, 218-23, 262 supra and accompanying text.
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such a determination should have been made at the time of the application,
but also that a determination of involuntary membership at trial would not
render the misrepresented or concealed fact immaterial because the voluntari-
ness of membership-a substantial question of eligibility-would have been
resolved in the precluded investigation, and a determination of ineligibility
might have resulted.2 88
CONCLUSION
The severe consequences inherent in a deportation or denaturalization order
denote the need for a consistent test of materiality that is narrow enough to
assure that such orders are not entered indiscriminately. Nevertheless, immi-
gration to the United States and the attainment of United States citizenship are
both significant privileges that demand the highest standard of truthfulness.
An alien who seeks the benefits and protections of United States laws
evidences a lack of respect for those laws when he offers false information in
applications. Therefore, a test must be sufficiently broad to maintain the
integrity of the United States and its authorized investigatory processes. If the
defendant's true activities and whereabouts would have led to an investigation
that would have revealed facts posing a substantial question of eligibility and
that might have resulted in a determination of ineligibility, the misrepresented
or concealed facts must be held to be material. 28 9
The nature of the pending cases involving alleged Nazi war criminals29 0
highlights the need for such a test. Thirty-five years have passed since the end
of a war in which the most heinous crimes were perpetrated. Witnesses are
old with frail memories; other evidence of defendants' acts may be difficult, if
not impossible, to obtain. Deportation or denaturalization should result if the
misrepresentation of the defendant's whereabouts and activities during the
war satisfies this test. Any other result would be a travesty of the United
States immigration laws and of the sentiments underlying the DPA, as well as
a mockery of those who were forced into the status of displaced persons by the
very people whom the DPA intended to exclude.
Irene Astrid Steiner
288. Id.
289. This synthesis of the Chaunt and Attorney General tests would best assure fairness to
both the United States and to the defendant. See notes 175-81, 192-201, 206-08 supra and
accompanying text. But see Note, Citizenship, 14 Tex. Int'l L.J. 453 (1979) (focusing only on
protection of the naturalized citizen while ignoring the interest of the United States and the quid
pro quo required for the conferral of the privilege of citizenship).
290. See notes 26-27 supra.
